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1. INTRODUCTION
Economists have made a distinction between risk (where probabilities are objectively known) and am-
biguity (where probabilities are unknown). Until recently it was not clear how to model this formally.
Schmeidler (1989) has proposed an axiomatic decision theory, which is able to model ambigu-
ity. In this theory, the decision-maker’s beliefs are represented by a capacity (non-additive subjective
probability) and (s)he is modelled as maximising the expected value of utility with respect to the
capacity. Ambiguity is represented by strictly non-additive capacities. The expectation is expressed
as a Choquet integral (Choquet (1953-4)). Schmeidler’s theory will henceforth be referred to as
Choquet expected utility (CEU).
A number of researchers have applied CEU (or related theories) to games1. Most of these papers
consider strategic (normal) form games. Lo (1999) suggests an equilibrium concept for extensive
form games under ambiguity. Since he uses the related multiple-prior expected utility theory to model
ambiguity, he discusses a number of conceptual problems which arise in the context of dynamic games
if players face strategic ambiguity. The paper contains many instructive examples but no general
theorems about existence of equilibrium if players face ambiguity.
Approaching the problem of extensive form games in a very general way, Lo (1999) cannot
exploit one of the strengths of non-additive probabilities, namely that unlike additive probabilities,
they can be updated after events with a capacity value of zero. In the present paper, we apply CEU to
sequential two-player games. This class of extensive form games comprises many important game-
theoretic models in economics such as signalling games, two-stage industrial organisation models
or bargaining problems. Restricting ourself to this class of games allows us to ignore some of the
consistency problems encountered in Lo (1999).
In extensive form games, updating of beliefs on newly acquired information is important. If beliefs
are represented by additive probability distributions, then Bayesian updating is the natural method to
incorporate the information obtained from the observed moves of the opponents. Bayesian updating
however is possible only at information sets which have a positive probability of being reached.
As is well-known, play at information sets off the equilibrium path can have a major effect on the
equilibrium itself. Thus it is important to determine players’ beliefs at such information sets. Because
1 See Dow & Werlang (1994), Eichberger & Kelsey (2000), Hendon et al (1994), Klibanoff
(1996)), Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000).
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Bayesian updating puts no restrictions on such beliefs, a multiplicity of equilibria is compatible with
Bayesian beliefs.
Games with incomplete information are usually plagued by a large number of Bayes-Nash equilib-
ria. Signallinggames in particular have typically anexcessively largenumber of equilibriabecause the
signal space is large compared to the type space, which implies that most actions will not be observed
in equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria depends on the lack of constraints on out-of-equilibrium
strategies. There is a huge literature in game-theory which tries to impose further constraints on be-
liefs by additional rules about how a player should interpret out-of-equilibrium moves in equilibrium.
Such constraints on beliefs refine the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria. CompareMailath(1992) for a
survey of refinements in the context of signalling games. Most refinements have been based on for-
ward or backward induction arguments. A common criticism of such arguments is that, if the initial
situation is indeed an equilibrium, then players should conclude from a deviation that the opponent
is not rational or does not understand the structure of the game.
In this paper, we propose a definition of equilibrium where players have non-additive beliefs and
use an updating rule proposed by Dempster and Shafer in the literature for capacities. This equilib-
rium notion comprises Bayes-Nash equilibrium as a special case. The Dempster-Shafer updating rule,
which is part of our equilibrium concept, has well-defined updated capacities off the equilibrium path
as long as there is ambiguity. Capacities can be further constrained by adequate assumptions about be-
liefs without affecting consistency of beliefs in an equilibrium under ambiguity. Hence, there is room
to put constraints on beliefs which may be specific to situation one wants to model. For example,
one can exogenously determine the degree of ambiguity or one can restrict beliefs to agree with an
additive prior distribution, if one wants to model a situation where players are completely confident
about the distribution of types but ambiguous about their opponents’ strategic behaviour. It is possi-
ble to control for the ambiguity of a situation in experiments in order to see how it affects decision
behaviour. For individual decision situations, such experiments have been performed (Camerer &
Weber (1992)). There are few experiments so far, which focus on strategic ambiguity, but we are
confident that such tests can be conducted.
One can parametrise the notion of ambiguity and demonstrate existence of equilibrium for any
exogenously determined level of ambiguity. This opens up the possibility to study sequences of equi-
libria under ambiguitywhich converge to aBayesian equilibrium as ambiguity vanishes. Assumptions
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about beliefs under ambiguity will determine which Bayesian equilibrium will be selected. An inter-
esting aspect of this approach is, even in a Bayesian equilibrium, beliefs off the equilibrium path may
be represented by capacities which are not additive. The greater freedom of modelling beliefs under
ambiguity provides a novel and useful modelling device for economic applications.
In section2 we introduce the CEU model and demonstrate someproperties of CEU and the Dempster–
Shafer updating rule. Section 3 introduces our solution concept for two-stage games under ambiguity
and relates it to some existing solution concepts. Section 4 studies limits of sequences of equilibria as
ambiguity vanishes. We show that ambiguous beliefs can select among Bayesian equilibria. Section
6 concludes the paper. All proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2. CEU PREFERENCES AND DS-UPDATING
In this section we consider a finite set S of states of nature. A subset of S is referred to as an event.
The set of possible outcomes or consequences is denoted by X. An act is a function from S to X.
The space of all acts is denoted by A(S) := faj a : S ! Xg. The decision-maker’s preferences
over A(S) are denoted by <.
A capacity or non-additive probability on S is a real-valued function º on the subsets of S; which
satisfies the following properties:
(i) A µ B implies º (A) 6 º (B) ;
(ii) º (?) = 0; º (S) = 1:
The capacity is said to be convex if for all A;B µ S; º(A [ B) > º(A) + º(B) ¡ º(A \ B):
Representing beliefs by a convex capacity is compatible with experimental evidence (see Camerer
& Weber (1992)) and is commonly used in applications of CEU to model ambiguity averse be-
haviour. We shall assume that all capacities are convex.
We shall use capacities to represent the beliefs of players. In game-theoretic applications, the
opponents’ strategy combinations will be the relevant states for a player. It is possible to define an
expected value with respect to a capacity to be a Choquet integral (Choquet (1955)).
For any function Á : S ! R and any outcome x 2 X let B(xjÁ) := fs 2 S : Á (s) > xg be the
event in which Á is greater than or equal to x: Similarly, denote byB(xjÁ) := fs 2 S : Á (s) > xg the
event in which Á produces a strictly greater outcome than x: The Choquet integral of Á with respect
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to the capacity º is defined asZ
Á dº :=
nX
x2Á(S)
x ¢ [º(B(xjÁ)) ¡ º(B(xjÁ))]; (1)
where the summation is over the range of the act, Á(S) := fx 2 Xj 9 s 2 S; Á(s) = xg:
We shall assume that preferences may be represented by Choquet expected utility (CEU) with
respect to a capacity, i.e.
a < b,
Z
u(a(s))dº (s) >
Z
u (b (s)) dº (s) :
Such preferences have been axiomatised by Gilboa (1987) and Sarin & Wakker (1992).
Definition 2.1 The degree of ambiguity of capacity º is defined by
¸(º) := 1¡ min
AµS(º(A) + º(SnA)):
This definition is adapted from Dow & Werlang (1992). It has been justified epistemolog-
ically by Mukerji (1997). The degree of ambiguity is a measure of the deviation from additivity.
For an additive probability ¸(º) = 0, while for complete ambiguity ¸(º) = 1. The following re-
sult confirms that the degree of ambiguity is a reasonable measure of deviation from additivity, for
convex capacities2.
Lemma 2.2 If a convex capacity º has zero degree of ambiguity then it is additive.
2.1 The support of a capacity
In game theory, players are assumed to maximise their expected payoffs. Strategy choices are consid-
ered in equilibrium if beliefs are consistent with actual behaviour. The strongest form of consistency,
Nash equilibrium, requires players’ beliefs to coincide with their actual behaviour. In an alternative
and equivalent definition of Nash equilibrium the strategies in the support of the opponents’ beliefs
about a player’s behaviour must be best responses of that player. In other words, players expect their
opponents to play only best-response strategies.
If decision makers’ ambiguity is modelledby capacities then there are several concepts of a support
which all coincide with the usual notion of support in the case of additive capacities. In this paper
we will use the following definition.
2 The lemma is false if convexity is not assumed. A counter-example would be the class of symmetric capacities studied
by Gilboa (1989) and Nehring (1994).
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Definition 2.3 A support of a capacity º is an event A µ S such that º(SnA) = 0 and º(SnB) > 0;
for all events B ½ A:
This definition of the support is due toDow & Werlang (1994). Above we define the support
of a capacity to be a minimal set whose complement has a capacity value of zero. This is equivalent
to the usual definition of support (i.e. a minimal set of probability one) for an additive capacity but
will generally yield a smaller set if the capacity is not additive.
With this support notion every capacity has a support. However it has been criticised because the
support is not necessarily unique and states outside the support may affect decision making if a bad
outcome occurs on them. In Eichberger & Kelsey (2001a)we provide an extensive discussion
of various support notions for capacities suggested in the literature3. In particular, we show that the
support is unique if and only if one requires in addition º(B) > 0; for all events B in the support.
Adding this requirement to Definition 2.3 guarantees a unique support but there are convex capacities
for which no such support exists. In game-theoretic applications, the lack of uniqueness poses no
problem because we show the existence of an equilibrium in which beliefs have a unique support.
Moreover, our results and examples all have unique supports, which satisfy this additional restriction.
More substantial is the objection to Definition 2.3 that states outside the support are not Savage-
null. An event E is Savage-null if outcomes on E never affect a decision, i.e. if aEc » bEc for all
acts a; b; c; where aEc denotes an act which yields a(s) for all states in E and c(s) in all other states.
We believe that this argument is not appropriate in game-theoretic applications. We will argue this
case below in context with the game-theoretic equilibrium concept, which we advance in this paper.
2.2 CEU preferences and DS-updating
In sequential games players may receive information about the opponents by observing their moves
in earlier stages of the game. In particular in signalling games, second-stage players will try to infer
informationabout characteristics of their opponents from the signals which they receive. It is therefore
necessary to specify a rule for how to revise beliefs represented by capacities in the light of new
information.
If beliefs are additive, Bayes’ rule is the unique updating rule which maintains additivity. As in
the case of the support, with non-additive capacities there are several updating procedures, which all
3 Haller (2000), Marinacci (2000) and in particular Ryan (1999) discuss and argue for other support notions.
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coincide with Bayesian updating in the case of additivity. Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) provide
an exposition and an axiomatic treatment from a behavioural perspective. In this paper we choose
the Dempster-Shafer belief revision rule (see Shafer (1976)).
Definition 2.4 Dempster-Shafer revision
The Dempster-Shafer revision of capacity º given event E ½ S is
º(F jE) := º((F \E)[ (SnE))¡ º(SnE)
1¡ º(SnE) : (2)
The axiomatisation by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) shows that the Dempster-Shafer rule
(DS-rule) may be interpreted as a pessimistic updating rule. If one views capacities as constraints
on a set of additive probability distributions then it is equivalent to a maximum likelihood updating
procedure.
For extensive-form games the DS-rule is particularly interesting, since it may be defined even
when º(E) = 0. If the eventE; about which the decision maker obtains information, was ambiguous,
º(E)+º(SnE) < 1; then the DS-rule will be well-defined even if it has a prior capacity value of zero.
Thus, it maybe possible toupdate non-additive beliefs on events with acapacity value of zero. We will
argue in Section 4 that this property of DS-updating provides an approach to equilibrium selection
based on ambiguity of players. Contrary to the refinements of Bayes-Nash equilibrium based on
second-order reasoning about out-of-equilibrium moves, which dominate the literature, ambiguity-
related refinements can be given a behavioural content which is independent of the equilibrium notion.
3. SEQUENTIAL TWO-PLAYER GAMES
In this paper we will consider two-player games with complete and incomplete information, where
players move sequentially. Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout that player 1 moves
first and that player 2 knows the move of player 1 when she makes her move. Player 1 may have
one of several types which are described by a finite set T: If T contains a single type the game has
complete information, otherwise it is of incomplete information. Beliefs about types will be described
below. Both players choose actions from finite action sets Ai; i = 1; 2: Their payoffs are described
by the utility functions ui(s;a; t); i = 1; 2:
Strategies of player 1 coincide with actions, S1 := A1: In contrast, player 2 who observes the
action of player 1 can condition her moves on this observation. Hence, S2 := fs2j s2 : S1 ! A2g
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denotes the strategy set of player 2, which is also finite because the action sets of both players are
finite. We will denote by s2(s1) 2 A2 the action, which player 2 will choose in response to s1
according to her strategy s2:
Both players hold beliefs about the opponent’s behaviour which are represented by convex capac-
ities. Player 1 has beliefs º2 about the strategies in S2; which player 2 will choose. A belief º2 on S2
of player 1 about player 2’s strategy induces a set of beliefs feº2jj s1j 2 S1g about the actions in A2;
which player 2 will choose in response to a strategy s1j 2 S1 : eº2j(E) := º2(fs2 2 S2j s2(s1j ) 2 Eg):
For notational convenience we will state definitions and results in terms of º2 though the respective
statements translate easily into statements about the set of beliefs about actions feº2j j s1j 2 S1g:
Player 2 has to form beliefs about strategic behaviour of the possible types of player 1. Beliefs
of player 2 about player 1’s type-contingent strategy choices are represented by the capacity º1 on
S1 £ T: These beliefs represent jointly this player’s ambiguity about type and strategy4. In game-
theoretic applications it is usually assumed that prior beliefs about types are common knowledge and
additive. We can constrain º1 to be compatible with an exogenous prior distribution over types, which
is represented by a (possibly additive) capacity ¹ on the type space T:
Definition 3.1 A capacity º on S1 £ T agrees with the capacity ¹ on T if, for any subset T 0 of T ,
º(S1 £ T 0) = ¹(T 0):
Whether the prior belief of player 2, º1; agrees with a prior distribution on types or not, once player
2 observes the action s1; which player 1 chooses she will have to revise her beliefs in the light of this
information. To simplify notation, we will write
º1(T 0js1) : = º1(S1 £ T 0jfs1g £ T) (3)
=
º1((fs1g £ T 0) [ ((S1nfs1g)£ T))¡ º1((S1nfs1g)£ T )
1 ¡ º1((S1nfs1g) £ T)
to denote the DS-updated capacity of the event T 0 ½ T if the action s1 has been observed. This
DS-update is well-defined if º1((S1nfs1g) £ T ) < 1 holds. This condition is satisfied if
² either player 2 feels ambiguity about player 1’s choice of the strategy s1, i.e.,
the event fs1g £T is ambiguous, i.e. if º1(fs1g £ T) + º1((S1nfs1g) £ T) < 1;
² or player 2 is certain that player 1 will play strategy s1 with positive probability, i.e.,
4 Here we follow the approach of Milgrom & Roberts (1986) for the representation of games under incomplete
information.
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the event fs1g £T is unambiguous and º1(fs1g £ T ) > 0:
Finally, let
P 1(s1jt; º2) :=
Z
u1(s1; s2(s1); t) dº2 (4)
and, for a capacity ½ on T;
P 2(ajs1; ½) :=
Z
u2(s1; a; t) d½ (5)
be the CEU-payoff of player 1 and 2 respectively. The belief ½ about player 1’s type will either be º1
or º1(¢js1); depending on whether beliefs are formed by DS-updating or not.
3.1 Dempster-Shafer equilibrium
In order to see the relationship between the Dempster-Shafer equilibrium concept, which will be
proposed in this section, with the familiar notion of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, consider the case
of additive capacities ¼1 and ¼2 representing players’ beliefs.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with prior distribution p on T is
² a probability distribution ¼1 on S1 £ T such that P
s12S1
¼(s1; t) = p(t) for all t 2 T;
² a probability distribution ¼2 on S2;
² and a family of probability distributions f¹(¢js1)gs12S1 on T such that:
a) (s1; t) 2 supp¼1 then s1 2argmaxes12S1
P
s22S2
¼2(s2) ¢ u1(es1; s2(es1); t);
b) s2 2 supp ¼2 then s2(s1) 2arg maxea2A2
P
t2T
¹(tjs1) ¢ u2(s1;ea; t);
for all s1 2 S1;
c) ¹(tjs1) = ¼(s1;t)P
t2T
¼(s1 ;t) if
P
t2T
¼(s1; t) > 0:
(PBE)
The standard interpretation is that ¼1(s1jt) := ¼(s1;t)p(t) ; ¼2(ajs1) := ¼2(fs2 2 S2j s2(s1) = ag) are
behaviour strategies and ¹(¢js1) are beliefs at the information set reached after move s1: Behaviour
strategies are identified with beliefs of players. Note that the belief interpretation requires ¼1 to be
the belief of player 2 about the behaviour of player1 and vice versa.
Without the family of probability distributions f¹(¢js1)gs12S1; conditions PBE-a and PBE-b define
a Bayesian equilibrium if one uses ¼(s1; t) instead of ¹(tjs1) in PBE-b. Obviously, all PBE are
Bayesian equilibria. All a PBE requires in addition to the conditions of a Bayesian equilibrium is
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optimality of behaviour at information sets off the equilibrium path, i.e., after moves s1 such thatP
t2T
¼(s1; t) = 0; with respect to some arbitrary additive belief ¹(tjs1): Hence, it only rules out strictly
dominated actions at such information sets. Since beliefs at information sets off the equilibrium path
are arbitrary, there are usually many PBE depending on the beliefs ¹(tjs1) assumed at information
sets off the equilibrium path.
This multiplicity of PBE poses a serious problem in games, where there are few types of player 1
and many more strategies of this player, as it is typically the case in signalling games. The literature
is therefore particularly rich in refinements for signalling games. Mailath (1992) provides a good
survey of the refinements applied in the context of signalling games. We show below in Example
4.2 how with ambiguity aversion, a quite natural assumption on beliefs can reduce this multiplicity
of equilibria.
Games in strategic form where thebeliefs of players are representedby capacitieshave been studied
byDow & Werlang (1994), Marinacci (2000) and Eichberger & Kelsey (2000). In
the strategic form, beliefs (º1; º2) form an equilibria under uncertainty if these beliefs have supports
containing only pure strategies which are optimal for the respective player given these beliefs.
In this paper we study sequential two-player games where the action of player 1 conveys infor-
mation to player 2. This requires a reformulation of the equilibrium concept. In contrast to the
equilibrium notion in the strategic form, we will require that player 2’s strategy consists of actions
that are optimal at each information set, i.e. after observing the action of player 1.
Definition 3.2 Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (DSE)
A Dempster-Shafer equilibrium consists of capacities º1 on S1 £T; º2 on S2 and a family of capac-
ities f½(¢js1)gs12S1 on T such that there are supports suppº1 and supp º2 satisfying:
a) (s1; t) 2 supp º1 then s1 2arg maxes12S1 P 1(es1jt; º2);
b) s2 2 supp º2 then s2(s1) 2arg maxea2A2 P 2(eajs1; ½(¢js1))
for all s 2 S1;
c) ½(T 0js1) = º1(T 0js1) if º1((S1nfs1g)£ T ) < 1:
(DSE)
In general, the support of a capacity need not be unique. Hence, a DSE requires us to specify a
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set of beliefs and some associated support. In most applications the capacities considered will have a
unique support and this seemingly arbitrary choice of support for a given capacity poses no problem5.
Condition DSE-a of Definition 3.2 guarantees that only optimal type-contingent strategies of player
1 will be included in the support of player 2’s beliefs. Similarly, by condition DSE-b there are only
strategies in the support of player 1’ beliefs which prescribe optimal behaviour after a strategy of
player 1. We call the equilibrium a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium (DSE) because, according to DSE-
c, beliefs of player 2 about the type of player 1 are obtained by the DS-updating rule.
Remark: A Dempster-Shafer equilibrium is defined as a set of beliefs over type-contingent strate-
gies (º1; º2) and a set of updated beliefs after strategy choices of player 1, f½(¢js1)gs12S1: By Con-
dition DSE-c the updated beliefs f½(¢js1)gs12S1 are however a derived concept. When referring to a
DSE we therefore often mention only (º1; º2); if there is no danger of confusion.
The degree of ambiguity ¸(ºi); formally defined in the previous section, is a property of the equi-
librium beliefs (º1; º2). We will demonstrate below in Proposition 3.5 that one can take this degree
of ambiguity as an exogenous parameter and deduce equilibrium beliefs. The DSE concept is useful
for economic applications because one can study games under different degrees of ambiguity. Nash
equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium under no ambiguity. Since the DS-updated capacity
½(¢js1) is a derived concept its degree of ambiguity ¸(º1(¢js1)) is also a derived property6.
We define the degree of ambiguity of a game to be the maximal degree of ambiguity of the equi-
librium beliefs. Formally, we will say that
² a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium (º1; º2) has degree of ambiguity ¸ 2 [0; 1] if¸ := maxf¸(º1); ¸(º2)g;
and
² a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium (º1; º2) agreeswith the additive prior distribution p onT if º1(S1£
ftg) = p(t) for all t 2 T:
If the beliefs of a DSE are additive, i.e., if there is no ambiguity, and if there is a common prior
distribution over types then a DSE is a Bayesian equilibrium.
The following proposition relates the Dempster-Shafer equilibrium concept to the Bayesian equi-
5 There are, however, interesting cases where supports are not unique, yet where there is only one support for each
capacity which is consistent with the optimality conditions DSE-a and DSE-b.
6 For specific types of capacities one can prove implications for the degree of ambiguity of their DS-update. Compare
Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
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librium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium notions.
Proposition 3.3
a) A Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1; º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which the belief
of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T; is a Bayesian Equilibrium.
b) Consider a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1; º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which
the belief of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T: If for each strategy
s1 2 S1 there exists a type t 2 T such that (s1; t) 2 suppº; then the Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium
(º1; º2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Discussion of the DSE concept. Proposition 3.3 shows that Bayesian equilibrium and perfect
Bayesian equilibrium are special cases of a DSE if there is no ambiguity. There is mounting exper-
imental evidence that Nash equilibrium and its refinements do not yield good predictions of actual
behaviour in all games. Situations in which one finds consistent deviations from the Nash equilib-
rium hypothesis include bargaining, e.g. the ultimatum bargaining experiments (Roth (1995)),
coordination problems (Ochs (1995)), public goods provision (Ledyard (1995)), and signalling
games (Brandts & Holt (1992,1993)). These findings pose a challenge to theory and call for
the investigation of modified equilibrium concepts. Some of these anomalies can be explained by
altruistic preferences, e.g. in the cases of public goods and bargaining. Even in these cases however,
it is difficult to account for all the observed phenomena by modifying preferences alone.
The approach we propose in this paper focuses on ambiguity about the behaviour of the opponent
players. We do not give up the idea that players maximise their expected payoff but we investigate
how ambiguity about the strategic behaviour of opponents affects the equilibria of games. Ambiguity
about the opponents’ behaviour may arise by a number of reasons.
Traditional game theory maintains that players deduce beliefs about the opponents’ behaviour from
firm knowledge about the preferences of opponents. In games with incomplete information one re-
places knowledge about other players’ payoffs, with knowledge about the probability distribution
over possible types of payoffs. Though logically sound and completely consistent, modelling games
of incomplete information by probability distributions over type spaces assumes that players have
extremely high computational abilities.
Ambiguity about the strategic behaviour of the opponent players ref lects the difficulty of settling
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one’s beliefs firmly on a particular probability distribution over types and their behaviour. This does
not imply that players do not care about the motivation of the opponents or that they do not consider the
possibility of different types of opponents. It means however that their behaviour may be influenced
by the fact that they do not feel certain about such inferences.
Ambiguous beliefs represented by capacities, allow us to model players who hold and process
information about their opponents in order to predict their behaviour but who, depending on the
situation, may feel more or less certain about these predictions. If ambiguity is about two or more
possible characteristics of an opponent then beliefs should be modelled by a capacity over the relevant
type space, if ambiguity concerns the correct description of the situation in general it is best modelled
by ambiguity about the opponents’ strategy choices. Equilibrium concepts for ambiguous players,
like the DSE suggested here, provide also a unified framework, in which the completely consistent
beliefs of Nash equilibrium analysis as well as behaviour influenced by ambiguity can be analysed.
3.1.1 Ambiguity about the strategy choice of the opponents
In traditional game-theoretic reasoning, players trust completely their reasoning about the rationality
of their opponents. If players believe that an opponent’s strategy is strictly dominated, then they
will act on the presumption that this player will never choose this strategy. Similarly, strategies of
the opponents which are not in the support of the capacity representing a player’s belief should not
influence this player’s behaviour.
The following example illustrates that these properties are not true for DS-equilibria. In Example
3.1 there are two DS-equilibria, one which describes behaviour similar to the backward-induction
Nash equilibrium. The second DSE shows that strategies of the opponent with bad outcomes may
influence the decision of a player, even if the opponents strategy is strictly dominated and not in the
support of this player’s beliefs.
Example 3.1 Frivolous lawsuits7
Bebchuk (1988) studies legal disputes where the plaintiff threatens to go to court even if the ex-
pected value of the court case is negative in order to extract a settlement offer from the defendant.
Figure 1 represents a stylised version of this situation. Once the potential plaintiff has threatened
to go to court the defendant, D; can make an settlement offer o which will be accepted or refuse to
7 The structure of this game corresponds to the well-known entry game in Industrial Organisation.
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Figure 1: Frivolous suit
make an offer, no; in which case the plaintiff, P; has to decide whether to drop the case, d; or to go
to court, c: The payoffs ref lect the incentives of the players. If the defendant makes no offer, no; and
the potential plaintiff decides not to file the suit, d; both players receive a payoff of 1: If the plaintiff
goes to court, c; both players obtain ¡1, which reflects the negative expected value of the court case.
A settlement offer, which is accepted, yields the plaintiff a payoff of 3 and the defendant a payoff
of 0: The settlement yields the plaintiff a higher payoff than not going to court, the incentive for the
frivolous suit8.
This is a game with complete information where player 1, the defendant, has a single type t, the no-
tation of which is suppressed. Hence, (½(tjno); ½(tjo)) = (1; 1) in any DSE. Equilibrium beliefs for
the two types of DS-equilibria of this game are given in the following table.
DS-equilibria f(ºD1 ; ºP1 ); (ºD2 ; ºP2 )g
event ºD1 (¢) ºD2 (¢)
fnog ®D > 0 0
fog 0 ®D > 0
SD 1 1
; 0 0
support: fnog fog
event ºP1 (¢) ºP2 (¢)
fdg ®P ¸ 12 ®P < 12fcg 0 0
SP 1 1
; 0 0
support: fdg fdg
The first DSE (ºD1 ; ºP1 ) describes behaviour which is similar to the backward induction equilibrium in
8 This example is a slightly modified and parametrised version of the model in Bebchuk (1988), p. 441.
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the analysis without ambiguity. The equilibrium beliefs need however not be additive. The plaintiff
decides not to go to trial. Whether the defendant D will refuse a settlement or not depends on the
strength of the belief ®P that the plaintiff will drop the case. For ®P ¸ 12 the defendant will make
no offer, otherwise a settlement offer is made. Filing the suit becomes weakly optimal only if the
plaintiff is completely certain that the defendant will not refuse a settlement, ºDi (fnog) = 0:
The second DSE (ºD2 ; ºP2 ) shows behaviour which cannot occur in a Nash equilibrium. In this case,
the plaintiff plans to drop the case if challenged. The defendant, on the other hand, feels sufficiently
ambiguous, ºP2 (fdg) = ®P < 12; about the prediction that the plaintiff will not file a suit, suppºP2 =
fdg; and will offer settlement. Such behaviour cannot be supported by a Nash equilibrium. Yet it
does not appear unreasonable. After careful consideration of the situation, the defendant may well
recognise the incentives of the plaintiff to drop the action. This conclusion depends however on
the correct perception of the situation as modelled by the game. If the defendant feels sufficiently
uncertain about this information she may be justified in offering settlement. Moreover, since the
defendant does not challenge the potential plaintiff, no information about the actual behaviour of the
plaintiff is generated. So one is also justified to call such a situation an equilibrium.
From Part (b) of Definition 3.2 it is clear that no strictly dominated strategy will be chosen in a
DSE. Therefore, one may be led to conclude that all DS-equilibria are backward induction equilibria.
This conclusion is false however, as the DSE (ºD2 ; ºP2 ) in Example 3.1 demonstrates. Ambiguity may
prevent players from choosing strategies which expose them to situations where they might be hurt by
a strictly dominated choice of the opponents. This may be so, even if they do not expect the opponents
to play strictly dominated strategies, if they do not trust this conclusion sufficiently.
Example 3.1 shows also that the DSE concept can describe behaviour, which is inconsistent with
the strict consistency requirements of a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, behaviour, as in equilibrium
(ºD2 ; ºP2 ); can occur only if the worst outcome of an interaction can inf luence the decision of a player
even if it is on events which are outside the support. If one would constrain the support notion to make
events outside the support Savage-null, i.e., irrelevant for the player, then this equilibrium would dis-
appear.
This is obvious from the following lemma which has been proved in Ryan (1998) (Lemma 1,
p.34).
Lemma 3.4 Let º be a capacity ona setS:AneventE ½ S is Savage-null if and only if º(SnE) = 1:
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Applying Lemma 3.4 to the equilibrium in Example 3.1 would imply ®D = ®P = 1: Hence, DSE
(ºD2 ; ºP2 )wouldno longer be possible and only the DSE (ºD1 ; ºP1 ) corresponding to a Nash equilibrium
would survive. Indeed, Lo (1996) (Corollary of Proposition 4, p. 468) shows that this is true for
all two-player games. Adopting such a strong notion of support therefore defeats the objective of
modelling ambiguity of players.
DSE offers more possibilities to model economic situations than traditional Bayesian analysis be-
cause consistency requirements on beliefs are weaker. In our opinion this additional freedom is useful
for modelling economic situations since it allows us to include aspects of the economic environment,
which are precluded by Bayesian analysis, but which are supported by experimental evidence or other
robust findings. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these applications in depth.
3.1.2 Ambiguity and Pessimism
With convex capacities, as we assume throughout this paper, ambiguity aversion is built into the
concept of the Choquet integral. This pessimism concerns however only events on which there is
ambiguity. DSE leaves us with more modelling options. DSE allows us to distinguish between the
preference of players for unambiguous choices and their pessimism in the face of ambiguity. For
example, if one would like to restrict ambiguity to an opponent’s strategic behaviour and considers
information about types as hard, one can model this by a capacity which agrees with an additive
prior distribution. In this case, pessimism is restricted to the behaviour of the opponent but not to
the probability over types. The following example which is due to Ryan (2002) illustrates such a
modelling option9.
Example 3.2 (Ryan 2002)
Consider a signalling game with two players, i = 1; 2; where player 1 can be one of two types
T = ft1; t2g: It is known that each type occurs with probability 12: Action sets for the two players are
A1 = fR;Lg and A2 = fU;Dg: Figure 2 represents the game.
9 This game has been advanced inRyan (2002) as an argument for a stronger support notion called ‘‘robust support’’.
In Eichberger & Kelsey (2001) we provide a detailed and more formal discussion of this approach.
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Figure 2: Ryan (2002)
It is easy to check that this game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
² player 1 of type t1 chooses L;
² player 1 of type t2 chooses R;
² player 2 chooses
U in response to L and R:
Ryan (2002) (p.12) argues that this equilibrium describes the only sensible behaviour in this game
because each type of player 1 has a strictly dominant strategy and player 2, knowing the strategy of
both types of player 1, maximises her payoff by choosing U: Moreover, the move U is also recom-
mended if player 2 is ambiguity averse since it guarantees the certain payoff of 1 no matter what type
player 1 turns out to be.
For a degree of ambiguity ® < 12; the following beliefs (º
1; º2) are a DSE which agrees with the
additive prior distribution (p(t1); p(t2)) = (12 ;
1
2):
º1(f(t1; L)g) = º1(f(t2; R)g) = ® ¢ 12 ;
º1(f(t1; L); (t2; L)g) = º1(f(t1; L); (t2; L)g) = ® ¢ 12 ;
º1(f(t1; L); (t1; R)g) = º1(f(t2; R); (t2; L)g) = 12;
º1(f(t1; L); (t2; L); (t2; R)g) = º1(f(t1; L); (t2; L); (t2; R)g) = (1 + ®) ¢ 12;
º1(E) = 0 for all other E ½ T £ S1;
and º2 is an additive probability distribution with º2(f(D;D)g) = 1:
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One checks easily that, for ® > 0, supp º1 = f(t1; L); (t2; R)g: The DS-updates are additive and
always well-defined: ½(t1jL) := º1(t1jL) = 12¡® and ½(t1jR) := º1(t1jR) = 1¡®2¡® :
Computing the CEU payoffs for these beliefs yieldsP 1(Ljt1; º2) = P 1(Rjt2; º2) = 1; P 1(Rjt1; º2) =
P 1(Ljt2; º2) = 0 and
P 2(eajs1; º1) =
8>>>><>>>:
1 for ea = U
4 ¢ 1¡®2¡® for ea =D for s1 = L
1 for ea = U
4 ¢ 1¡®2¡® for ea =D for s1 = R
:
For ® < 23; D is the best response of player 2 no matter which strategy player 1 chooses, and L
and R are the best strategies for player 1 of type t1 and t2 respectively. Since the support of º1 is
f(t1; L); (t2; R)g and of º2 is fD;Dg; playing D is a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium.
For ® ¸ 23 ; (U;U ) is the best response of player 2 and the associated DSE yields the same behaviour
as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Notice that the DS-updates º1(t1js1) equal the prior distribution for ® = 0; the case of complete
strategic ambiguity ¸(º1) = 1. For ® = 1; that is complete strategic certainty ¸(º1) = 0; the DS-
updates correspond to the Bayesian updates, º1(t1jL) = 1 and º1(t1jR) = 0:
If there is no strategic ambiguity, then player 1’s moves provide a perfect signal for the type of
player 1, i.e. suppº1 = f(t1; L); (t2; R)g; and player 2 will respond by choosing U in response.
With complete ambiguity about player 1’s strategy choice, player 2 will assess the likelihood of the
two types with the prior probability 12 :Based on the expected payoff with respect to the unambiguous
prior distribution player 2 will find action D optimal, and not U:Whether the action U orD is chosen
depends therefore on the degree of ambiguity which player 2 feels about the deduced equilibrium
behaviour. If ambiguity is low, ¸(º1) = 1 ¡ ® < 13; then player 2 will choose U and if ambiguity
is high she will choose D: The critical level which determines when the behaviour of player 2 will
change depends, of course, on the payoff of actions.
If a player feels great ambiguity regarding the strategy of the opponent but not with respect to
the prior type distribution, then DS-updating on the observed actions leads the player to disregard
the ambiguous strategy and to decide based on the unambiguous prior. Faced with strategic informa-
tion, a player who is extremely ambiguous about strategic information and unambiguous about type
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information will revert to the unambiguous information of the prior distribution10.
One can, of course, question the assumption about the unambiguous prior distribution. Indeed, we
do not require that beliefs do in general agree with unambiguous priors. It is an easy exercise to check
that, with complete ambiguity about the prior distribution, the argument that pessimism commends
to play U in order to secure the constant payoff of 1 is correct.
3.2 Existence and properties of DSE
Since Bayesian equilibria are DS-equilibria with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0, existence of a DSE is
guaranteed under the usual conditions. It is not clear however whether there exist DS-equilibria for
arbitrary degrees of ambiguity ¸ and arbitrary prior beliefs about types. Proposition 3.5 shows that
DS-equilibria exist under the usual assumptions for any degree of ambiguity.
Proposition 3.5 For any degree of ambiguity ¸ 2 (0; 1) and any additive prior probability distribu-
tion p on T; there exists a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium with this degree of ambiguity ¸ which agrees
with the distribution p on T:
Proposition 3.5 shows that the DSE concept can be applied in all cases, in which standard Nash
equilibria exist. Moreover, it shows that one can choose the degree of ambiguity ¸ exogenously as a
characteristic of a situation and still obtain DS-equilibria. This property is particularly important in
economic applications where one wants to study the impact of ambiguity on the behaviour of agents11
Games with complete information, i.e., with a type space containing a single type, jT j = 1; form
an important special case to which one can apply DSE. The DSE (ºD2 ; ºP2 ) in Example 3.1 shows
that behaviour in DS-equilibria does not necessarily correspond to behaviour in backward induction
equilibria.
Backward induction in the presence of Knightian uncertainty has also been discussed by Dow &
Werlang (1994). This paper shows that if there is ambiguity, there are non-backward induction
equilibria in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. These equilibria arise with large degrees
of ambiguity, which is compatible with our analysis. Dow & Werlang (1994) analyse games in
normal form. Our theory confirms their analysis with an extensive form solution concept based on
Knightian uncertainty. We believe that an extensive form solution concept is preferable, since DSE
10 Ryan (2002) considers the case ® = 12 : In this case, the DSE predicts player 2 to play D: He sees a tension between
the interpretation of Choquet preferences as pessimistic and the preference for the action D which is risky rather than
playing U; an action yielding a constant outcome of 1.
11 Eichberger & Kelsey (2001, 2001b) study applications to economic problems.
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requires that equilibrium strategies are optimal when each move is made. A solution defined on the
normal form cannot do this.
4. DSEL AS A NASH EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT
In Example 3.1 the DSE with little or no ambiguity selects the backward induction equilibrium. With
no ambiguity ¸ = 0; Dempster-Shafer equilibria, where each strategy of player 1 is played by some
type, are perfect Bayesian equilibria (Proposition 3.3). These results suggest that DSE equilibria with
ambiguity may provide reasonable restrictions on beliefs, which in the limit as ambiguity vanishes se-
lect Bayesian equilibria which are robust with respect to ambiguity. In order to explore this possibility
more formally we define a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium Limit (DSEL).
Ambiguity may affect beliefs over types and beliefs over strategy choice. We do not want to
exclude the possibility that ambiguity extends also to ambiguity about types, but we will require
only ambiguity about strategies in order to allow for capacities which agree with an additive prior
distribution.
Condition A A DSE (º1; º2) is subject to strategic ambiguity if
º1(fs1g £ T) + º1((S1nfs1g) £ T) < 1
holds for all s1 2 S1:
If a DSE is subject to strategic ambiguity, then the degree of ambiguity is strictly positive, even if
the equilibrium beliefs agree with an additive prior distribution over types. Thus, Condition A allows
us to consider sequences of Dempster-Shafer equilibria with positive degree of ambiguity which agree
with a given additive prior distribution over types.
Definition 4.1 Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium Limit (DSEL)
A set of beliefs (º1; º2) and updated beliefs f½(¢js1)gs12S1 is a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium Limit
(DSEL) if it is the limit of asequenceof strategically ambiguous Dempster-Shafer equilibria ((º1n; º2n);f½n(¢js1)gs12S1 ) such that the degree of ambiguity ¸ tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
By Proposition 3.5 there exists a DSE ((º1n; º2n); f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) for any degree of ambiguity
¸n > 0; where, for all s1 2 S1; ½n(¢js1) is well-defined by the DS-updates º1n(¢js1): By convexity of
the capacities, º in(E) 2 [0; 1]; for all events E µ Si; i = 1; 2; and for all n: Since we consider finite
games, the sequence (º1n; º2n) is contained in [0; 1]m; where m = jT j + jS1j + jS2j: Hence, for any
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sequence ¸n ! 0 theremust be a converging subsequence (º1n; º2n) ! (º1; º2)and½n(¢js1) ! ½(¢js1)
for all s1 2 S1: Thus, DSEL is always well-defined.
Notice that a DSEL requires also to specify a sequence of updated capacities f½n(¢js1)gs12S1 :
Since we impose strategic ambiguity there exists always a supporting sequence of Dempster-Shafer
equilibria for which the updated beliefs f½n(¢js1)gs12S1 are well defined by the DS-updates. Even if
DS-updates are well-defined along the sequence of DS-equilibria, a DSEL ((º1; º2); f½(¢js1)gs12S1)
may have non-additive DS-updates ½(¢js1) for strategies s1; which are not played in equilibrium.
The following example shows that beliefs off the equilibrium path need not be additive. In partic-
ular, the sequence of DS-equilibria supporting a DSEL
² can be strategically ambiguous,
² agree with an additive prior distribution and
² have well-defined DS-updates.
Notice that a DSEL also requires the specification of a sequence of updated capacities. Yet, as the
degree of ambiguity converges to zero, additive beliefs (º1; º2) obtain in the limit, but DS-updates
½(¢js1) may remain non-additive if strategy s1 is not played in the DS-equilibria of the supporting
sequence.
Example 4.1
Consider the signalling game, in Figure 3. The strategy set of player 1 isA1 = fL;Rg and of player
2, A2 = fu;m; dg: There are two types of player 1, T = ft1; t2g, which occur with probability p1
and p2; p1 > p2 for concreteness.
In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium both types of player 1 choose R; since any belief ¹(¢jR) makes d
strictly dominated for player 2. But if player 2 plays d with probability zero, strategy R strictly dom-
inates strategy L for player 1. Hence, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where player 2
chooses u:
There are two types of DSEL agreeing with the additive prior distribution (p1; p2):The completely ad-
ditive DSEL
¡
(eº1;eº2); (e½(¢jR);e½(¢jL))¢ ; eº1(t1; R) = p1; eº1(t2; R) = p2; e½(t1jR) = p1; e½(t2jR) =
p2; eº2(u) = 1; is behaviourally equivalent to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This DSEL is sup-
ported by a sequences of strategically ambiguous E-capacities which agree with the prior distribution.
For details about the construction of such a sequence seeEichberger, J. & Kelsey, D. (1999).
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Figure 3: Non-additive beliefs off the equilibrium path
There is however another DSEL (º1; º2) where the updated beliefs of player 1 are not additive. For
any ® 2 [0; 13); consider the following sequence of DS-equilibria:
E º1n(E)f(t1; L)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p1
f(t1; R)g 0
f(t2; L)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p2
f(t2; R)g 0
f(t1; L); (t1; R)g p1
f(t1; L); (t2; L)g 1¡ ¸n
f(t1; L); (t2; R)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p1
f(t1; R); (t2; L)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p2
f(t1; R); (t2; R)g 0
f(t2; R); (t2; L)g p2
f(t1; L); (t2; L); (t2; R)g 1 ¡¸n + ¸n ¢ ®
f(t1; R); (t2; L); (t2; R)g p2
f(t2; L); (t1; L); (t1; R)g 1 ¡¸n + ¸n ¢ ®
f(t2; R); (t1; L); (t1; R)g p1
S 1
; 0
supp º1 f(t1; L); (t2; L)g
E º2n(E)
fug 0
fmg 0
fdg (1¡ ¸n)
fu;mg 0
fu; dg (1¡ ¸n)
fm; dg (1¡ ¸n)
S 1
; 0
supp º2 fdg
The DS-updated capacities ½n(t1jR) = º1n(t1jR) = ® and ½n(t2jR)g = º1n(t2js1) = ® are well-
defined, but strictly non-additive:
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Computing the CEU payoffs for the DSE (º1n; º2n); one easily checks that P 1(Ljti; º2n) = 1 > 0 =
P 1(Rjti; º2n) and, for ® < 13 ; P 2(djR; ½n) = 4 > 3 + 3 ¢ ® = P 2(ujR; ½n) = P 2(mjR; ½n) for all
n: Hence, the DSEL ((º1; º2); (½(¢jR); ½(¢jL))) ;
º1(t1; L) = p1; º1(t2; L) = p2; additive
½(t1jR) = ®; ½(t2jR) = ®; non-additive
º2(d) = 1; additive
follows from this sequence of DS-equilibria as ¸n ! 0.
The DSEL (º1; º2) is interesting since beliefs off the equilibrium path are non-additive, even
though beliefs on the equilibrium path are additive. Since perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that
beliefs be additive at all information sets, the expected payoff from u dominates the payoff from d.
DSEL, however, allows strict non-additivity off the equilibrium path, so that the certain payoff of 4
obtained from strategy d becomes more attractive. It is plausible that a player who has observed an
out-of-equilibrium move will have some doubts about his original theory of how the game is played.
This could cause him to become ambiguity-averse as represented by the non-additivity of the updated
beliefs. DSEL allows us to model ambiguity of a player as a consequence of having to update beliefs
on events with a capacity weight of zero.
Example 4.1 shows also that there are few constraints on the DS-updates. Indeed, DSE, and there-
fore DSEL, allow us to impose constraints on players’ beliefs directly and to deduce equilibrium
beliefs satisfying these constraints. This opens the opportunity to design experiments where ambigu-
ity is manipulated independently from the equilibrium play which one wants to test.
4.1 Properties of DSEL
In this section, we will compare the concept of a DSEL with Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. Since Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilibria have an additive prior distribution over types
as a defining criterion we will restrict attention to Dempster-Shafer equilibria which agree with an
additive prior distribution throughout this section.
The capacities (º1; º2) of a DSEL are additive. So it is not difficult to prove that a DSEL is a
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution over types is a Bayesian
equilibrium.
All DSEL are Bayesian equilibria. The potential of strategic ambiguity to select among the set
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of Bayesian equilibrium lies in the updated beliefs. Beliefs are generated by the DS-updating rule
in combination with constraining assumptions about equilibrium beliefs. A DSE does not tie down
the equilibrium beliefs as much as Nash equilibrium does. Hence, there is room for game-specific
constraints on beliefs and attitudes towards ambiguity. Depending on the application one can focus on
the consequences of the degree of ambiguity aversion, of ambiguity about types or of other character-
istics of beliefs. The DS-updates inherit their properties from these fundamental assumptions. To the
extent that one can control for the degree of ambiguity, ambiguity aversion and other characteristics
of an environment one may be able to test equilibrium properties in experiments.
One of the weakest refinements of Bayesian equilibria is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By mak-
ing updated beliefs part of the equilibrium concept it guarantees optimising behaviour at all informa-
tion sets whether or not they will be reached in equilibrium. Since perfect Bayesian equilibrium puts
no constraint on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, it eliminates only equilibria relying on strictly dominated
strategies at information sets off the equilibrium path.
A DSEL allows for beliefs off the equilibrium path which are strictly non-additive. Hence, Exam-
ple 4.1 shows that a DSEL need not be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. One may however conjecture
that a DSEL with additive updates f½(¢js1)gs12S1 at all information sets is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. We will show below in Proposition 4.3 that this is the case, indeed.
One may also conjecture that the restrictions on beliefs induced by the sequence of stategically
ambiguous Dempster-Shafer equilibria would rule out DSEL with additive updates f½(¢js1)gs12S1 at
all information sets where a player uses a weakly dominated action. This is however not true. For
every perfect Bayesian equilibrium it is possible to construct a sequence of strategically ambiguous
DS-equilibria, which agree on the additive prior over types and converges to this perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. This is almost obvious if all information sets will be reached in the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. If there are information sets following actions which are not played in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, then one can find a sequence of DS-equilibria in which the DS-updates are not defined
at these information sets. Hence, one can assign the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs of the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium to those DS-equilibria. Thus, one can obtain even a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium where player 2 chooses weakly dominated strategies off the equilibrium path as a DSEL.
Proposition 4.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and DSEL
(i) Every perfect Baysian equilibrium is a DSEL.
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(ii) A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if all
updates are additive.
DS-updates of a DSEL can, but need not, be additive. Proposition 4.3 shows that additive limits
of the DS-updates is the crucial condition for the two concepts to coincide. If DS-updates do not con-
verge to additive probability distributions off the equilibrium path, then strategic ambiguity, modelled
by the DS equilibrium concept, provides a refinement of Nash equilibrium based on other principles
than standard refinements in the literature.
Mailath (1992) provides an excellent survey of the refinements most commonly used in sig-
nalling games. They all operate by restricting out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Justification for such re-
strictions is obtained by forward or backward induction arguments. There is an obvious tension in
such arguments because out-of-equilibrium behaviour is constrained by reasoning about behaviour
which will never be observed.
The DSEL provides an alternative approach to equilibrium selection. Modelling ambiguity about
the equilibrium strategy choices directly avoids the tension in the interpretation of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Moreover, there are behavioural theories behind the DS-updating rule (Gilboa & Schmei-
dler (1993)) and the Choquet expected utility model (Gilboa (1987), Sarin & Wakker
(1993)). Assumptions about the behavioural foundations of this decision and updating model can
and have been tested independently from the equilibrium notion (Camerer, C. & Weber, M.
(1992)).
4.2 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Refinement of the set of equilibria can be obtained by imposing additional restrictions on the players’
non-additive beliefs. As in the standard refinement literature, one can strengthen or weaken the ro-
bustness requirement imposed on Bayesian equilibrium by putting further constraints on the sequence
of ambiguous DS-equilibria which support it. In contrast to this literature such assumptions are in
principle testable.
DS-equilibria which are not perfect Bayesian equilibria are plausible, since they correspond to
cases in which player 2 is ambiguity-averse after observing an unexpected move. Example 4.1 il-
lustrates the potential of DSEL to select among Bayesian equilibria based on ambiguity about the
behaviour in case of an unexpected out-of-equilibrium move. Yet, even if we do not want to rely on
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non-additive beliefs off the equilibrium path, DSEL offers quite intuitive out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
It is impossible to develop here a complete theory of reasonable refinements based on ambiguity,
but the following example may provide some intuition. It is a simplified version of the education-
signalling model introduced by Spence (1973). It shows how ambiguity imposes plausible restric-
tions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which select the pooling equilibrium as the a unique DSEL12.
The intuition about beliefs is as follows. A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution
over types models a situation where a player feels ambiguity about the opponents’ behaviour but not
about the prior distribution over types. This is a natural assumption if past experience has provided in-
formation about the frequency of types but if there is no well-established way of signalling private in-
formation. In such a situation signalling is endogenous equilibrium behaviour. An out-of-equilibrium
move indicates a break-down of the implicit understanding of equilibrium behaviour. In such a case,
it appears quite reasonable to return to the ‘‘firm’’ information about the prior distribution over types.
Example 4.2 education signalling13
Consider two workers with different productivity, ÁH > ÁL: A worker’s productivity is private infor-
mation but it is commonknowledge that the proportion of high-productivity workers is p:Workers will
apply for a position in the firm with a wage proposal. A worker can ask for a high wage wH = ÁH ; a
low wage wL = ÁL; or the average wagew = p¢ÁH+(1¡p) ¢ÁL: The firm can only choose to accept
the application, a; or to reject it, r. In order to qualify for a high wage wH ; a worker must present an
education certificate. The strategywH implies that the worker has obtained this education certificate.
High-productivity workers can obtain the certificate at no cost, while low-productivity workers incur
a cost of ¡2:We will assume throughout that the education costs of the low-productivity worker are
not justified by the productivity and wage difference, 0 < wH ¡wL = ÁH ¡ ÁL < 2.
Figure 4 illustrates the situation.
In the notation of Section 3, the game is described by S1 = fwH ; wL; wg and S2 = fs2(s1)j
12 Notice that Example 4.2 is no contradiction to the result in Proposition 4.3. There are other DSELs corresponding to
the typical perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Spence signalling model.
13 This is a highly stylised version of the education signalling model by Spence (1973). For simplicity of the ex-
position, we have assumed that the education level is not a choice variable. A more general treatment of the education
signalling model can be found in Eichberger & Kelsey (1999a).
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Figure 4: Signalling game
s1 2 S1g and T = fH;Lg: It is easy to see that there are exactly two perfect Bayesian equilibria:
Worker Firm out-of-equilibrium beliefs
(i) ((wH; H ); (wL; L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (a; a; r); ¹(H jw) = 0:
(ii) ((w;H); (w;L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (r; a; a); ¹(H jwH) = ¹(H jwL) = 0:
For notational convenience, we have only noted the equilibrium strategies. In terms of beliefs, a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium (¼1; ¼2; f¹(¢js1)g) is described by ¼1(wH ; H) = 1; ¼1(wL; L) = 1 and
¼2(a; a; r) = 1 in case (i) and ¼1(w;H) = p; ¼1(w;L) = 1 ¡ p and ¼2(r; a; a) = 1 in case (ii).
Beliefs about all other strategies are zero.
Equilibrium (i) is the Pareto-optimal separating equilibrium selected by the intuitive criterion. Equi-
librium (ii) is the Pareto-optimal pooling equilibrium, which does not satisfy the ‘‘intuitive’’ belief
condition that wH > w could only come from the high-productivity type since only this player would
gain from such a deviation relative to the equilibrium payout.
If we assume that the prior distribution of types is hard knowledge, while equilibrium inferences about
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behaviour are ambiguous, then only behaviour of the pooling equilibrium (ii) can arise in a DSEL. We
will formalise this assumption about the beliefs by an E-capacity14. E-capacities are a modification
of simple capacities (or distorted probabilities) which have a constant degree of ambiguity and which
allow for marginal distributions which are additive.
Fix a common degree of ambiguity ¸n for both players. Denote by ¹to(E) the capacity which equals
1 for E = S1£T and 0 otherwise and by ¹o(F ) the capacity equalling 1 for F = S2 and 0 otherwise.
A compact way to write the E-capacities based on additive probability distributions ¼1 and ¼2 is
² º1n(E) := ¸n ¢ [p ¢ ¹H(E) + (1¡ p) ¢ ¹L(E)] + (1 ¡ ¸n) ¢ ¼1(E) for E µ S1 £ T;² º2n(F ) := ¸n ¢ ¹(F ) + (1¡ ¸n) ¢ ¼2(F ) for F µ S2: (6)
E-capacities are a convex combination between an additive probability distribution ¼i and a weighted
average of the capacities ¹to with weights equal to the probabilities of the prior distribution. Notice
that º1n(E) + º1n((S1 £ T )nE) = 1 ¡ ¸n and º2n(F ) + º2n(S2nF ) = 1 ¡ ¸n holds for all events
E 6= S1 £ T and F 6= S2: Thus, there is strict ambiguity if ¸n > 0 holds. E-capacities have also the
property that suppº i = supp¼i. The strategies in the support of the capacity, i.e., the strategies of
the opponents which must be optimal, are the strategies in the additive part of the E-capacity. Using
Equation 3, one can compute15 the DS-update of º1n as
º1n(Hjs1) = ¸n ¢ p+ (1¡ ¸n) ¢ ¼
1(s1; H)
¸n + (1¡ ¸n) ¢ [¼1(s1; H) + ¼1(s1; L)] :
For ¸n > 0; º1n(Hjs1) is well defined even if ¼1(s1; H) + ¼1(s1;L) = 0 holds, i.e., if no type plays
strategy s1 in equilibrium. Notice also that for ¼1(s1; H) + ¼1(s1; L) = 0; º1n(tjs1) = p(t) coincides
with the prior distribution. This means that a player who observes an out-of-equilibrium move s1 will
update her beliefs to the prior distribution. This property of an E-capacity which agrees with a prior
distribution appears sensible if one views the knowledge about the type distribution as firm compared
to the beliefs about strategy choices which represent just a consistency requirement for beliefs and
optimal actions.
It is easy to check that º1n ! ¼1 and º2n ! ¼2: Notice, however, that º1n(Hjs1) ! p for all s1: Hence,
in the limit, we have out-of-equilibrium beliefs ¹(HjwH) = ¹(HjwL) = p.
It remains to show that the beliefs in Equation 6 based on the additive probability distributions
¼1(w;H) = p; ¼1(w;L) = 1 ¡ p and ¼2(r; a; a) = 1 form a DSE. This is easily established since
14 Eichberger & Kelsey (1999) provide a thorough study of the properties of E-capacities and an axiomatisation.
15 An explicit computation is in Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
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suppº1n = f((w;H); (w;L))g; supp º2n = f(r; a; a)g and the expected payoff functions are:
P 1(s1jH; º2n) =
8<: wH ¢ º
1
n(s2(wH) = a) = 0 for s1 = wH
wL ¢ º1n(s2(wL) = a) = (1¡ ¸n) ¢wL for s1 = wL
w ¢ º1n(s2(w) = a) = (1¡ ¸n) ¢w for s1 = w
;
P 1(s1jL; º2n) =
8<: (wH ¡ 2) ¢ º
1
n(s2(wH) = a) = 0 for s1 = wH
wL ¢ º1n(s2(wL) = a) = (1 ¡ ¸n) ¢ wL for s1 = wL
w ¢ º1n(s2(w) = a) = (1 ¡ ¸n) ¢ w for s1 = w
and
P 2(eajs1; º1n) =
8>>>><>>>>:
[ÁL ¡ wH ] ¢ [1 ¡ p] for ea = a
0 for ea = r if s1 = wH
[ÁH ¡ wL] ¢ p for ea = a
0 for ea = r if s1 = wL
p ¢ ÁH + (1 ¡ p) ¢ ÁL ¡ w = 0 for ea = a
0 for ea = r if s1 = w
:
Hence, choosing w is optimal for the worker of either type and accepting a wage offer w is optimal
for the firm. This establishes that the beliefs in Equation 6 form a DSE for any n: The resulting
DSEL is therefore
Worker Firm out-of-equilibrium beliefs
(iii) ((w;H); (w;L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (r; a; a); ¹(HjwH) = ¹(HjwL) = p:
The equilibrium selection in the DSEL of Example 4.2 depends on the joint assumptions of an
unambiguous prior distribution over types and a degree of ambiguity aversion ¸n which, for each step
n; is the same for all events E ½ S1 £T:Constant ambiguity aversion controls for distorted beliefs16.
The result that out-of-equilibrium beliefs coincide with the additive prior distribution is driven by the
assumption that the prior distribution is unambiguously known. If this is the case, it makes sense
for a player to revert to the unambiguous information as implied by DS-updating, whenever an out-
of-equilibrium move occurs which invalidates the equilibrium behaviour prediction. In the game of
Example 4.2, this assumption about the prior distribution rules out the separating equilibrium. The
separating equilibrium would require complete trust in the equilibrium behaviour because a low-
productivity worker has an incentive to break away from the separating equilibrium and to propose
the average wage rather than the low wage. To argue that the firm should assume that an average wage
offer could only come from the low-productivity type would mean that the firm feels no ambiguity
about the behaviour of the workers.
16 To establish the result of Proposition 4.3 that every perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a DSEL we had to relax this
assumption of a constant degree of ambiguity in each step of the belief sequence supporting the DSEL.
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Incontrast to Bayesian equilibrium, DSE hasa updating rule which works also for out-of-equilibrium
beliefs if there is some ambiguity about strategy choices. Reasonable assumptions about beliefs can
be imposed directly. For example, partial information can be assumed as in the case of a well-known
prior distribution in Example 4.2. Whether this is an appropriate assumption or not can be assessed
independent from the equilibrium, which is an advantage in economic applications.
5. CONCLUSION
We have applied the theory of Knightian uncertainty to sequential games. The evidence suggests that
there are occasions in which individuals have large degrees of ambiguity. Despite this we believe that
an interesting case is when the degree of ambiguity is small. Under this assumption, we have shown
that our definition of equilibrium is a refinement of Bayesian equilibrium, which is similar in spirit
to perfect Bayesian equilibrium but does not exactly coincide with it. Since DSEL is a special case of
Bayesian equilibrium, no irrational behaviour is introduced by considering non-additive beliefs. As
we have shown, even in the limit as beliefs converge to additive probabilities, significant deviations
from behaviour under subjective expected utility are possible off the equilibrium path. We believe
this is one of our main innovations.
Appendix A
Lemma 2.2: If a convex capacity º has zero degree of ambiguity then it is additive.
Proof. Suppose that º is not additive, then there exist A;B ½ S, such that A\B = ; and º(A[B) >
º(A) + º(B): Let C = Sn(A [ B). Then since the degree of ambiguity is zero:
1 = º(A [B) + º(C) > º(A) + º(B) + º(C): (A-1)
By convexity, 1 = º((A [ B) [ (A [ C)) > º(A [ B) + º(A [ C) ¡ º(A): Since the degree
of ambiguity is zero, º(A [ B) = 1 ¡ º(C) and º(A [ C) = 1 ¡ º(B): Substituting, we obtain
1 > 1 ¡ º(C) + 1 ¡ º(B) ¡ º(A); but this contradicts A-1.
Proposition 3.3:
a) A Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1; º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which the
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belief of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p onT is a Bayesian Equilibrium.
b) Consider a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1; º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for
which the belief of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T: If for each
strategy s1 2 S1 there exists a type t 2 T such that (s1; t) 2 supp º; then the Dempster-Shafer
Equilibrium (º1; º2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. Part (a): Since the DSE (¼1; ¼2) has a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0, by Lemma 2.2, ¼1 and ¼2
must be additive probability distributions. Since the DSE agrees with an additive prior distribution
p on T;
P
s12S1 ¼1(s1; t) = p(t) for all t 2 T: Hence, condition DSE-a of Definition 3.2 can be
written as
s1 2argmaxes12S1
X
s22S2
¼2(s2) ¢u1(es1; s2(s1); t)
for all s1 2 S1 with ¼1(s1; t) > 0 and all t 2 T: Condition DSE-b requires
s2(s1) 2arg maxea2A2
X
t2T
½(tjs1) ¢ u2(s1;ea; t)
for all s2 2 S2 with ¼2(s2) > 0: By Condition DSE-c and Equation 3, ½(tjs1) := ¼1(S1£ftgjfs1g £
T) = ¼
1(s1;t)P
t2T ¼1(s1;t)
provided
P
t2T ¼
1(s1; t) 6= 0: Note that beliefs off the equilibrium path ½(tjs1) are
arbitrary and need not even be additive. For actions s1 2 S1 such that Pt2T ¼1(s1; t) = 0 all actions
a 2 A2 are optimal. Hence, Part (a) of Proposition 3.3 defines a Bayesian equilibrium with mixed
strategies (¼1; ¼2):
Part (b): If, in addition, for each strategy s1 2 S1 there exists a type t 2 T such that (s1; t) 2 supp¼1;
then
P
t2T ¼1(s1; t) 6= 0 for all s1 2 S1 and ½(tjs1) = ¼
1(s1 ;t)P
t2T ¼1(s1 ;t)
is defined at all information sets.
In this case, (¼1; ¼2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4:Let º be a capacity on a setS: An event E ½ S is Savage-null if and only if º(SnE) = 1:
Proof. An event E is Savage-null if for any three outcomes x; y; z 2 X the CEU value of the acts
xEy and zEy are equal, i.e.
u(x) ¢ º(E) + u(y) ¢ [1 ¡ º(E)] = u(y) ¢ º(SnE) + u(z) ¢ [1¡ º(SnE)]
where we assume, without loss of generality, u(x) > u(y) > u(z):This equality can hold for arbitrary
outcomes x; y; z 2 X with this order if and only if º(SnE) = 1 and º(E) = 0:
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Proposition 3.5: For any degree of ambiguity ¸ 2 (0;1) and any additive prior probability distri-
bution p on T; there exists a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium with this degree of ambiguity ¸; which
agrees with the distribution p on T:
Proof. The proof uses the special form of an E-capacity, which is extensively discussed in Eich-
berger & Kelsey (1999). E-capacities are modifications of an additive probability distribution
with a constant degree of ambiguity and, possibly, some additive marginal distributions. If there are
no additive marginals then E-capacities are simple capacities. Moreover, the support of an E-capacity
coincides with the support of its additive part. Hence, for given prior distributions of types and given
degrees of ambiguity, E-capacities are completely described by their additive part. Given beliefs
modelled by E-capacities, one can use standard arguments to show that there is a Nash-equilibrium in
mixed strategies for the modified game where the Choquet payoff functions are viewed as functions
of the additive part of the E-capacities.
Fix ¸1; ¸2 2 (0; 1) and any additive probability distribution p on T: For any finite set X denote by
¢(X) the set of additive probability distributions on X: Let ¢p(S1 £ T) be the set of additive prob-
ability distributions on S1 £ T with marginal distribution p on T: This set is non-empty, compact and
convex.
For any E ½ S1 £ T let the capacity º t be defined as
º t(E) :=
½
1 if S1 £ ftg ½ E
0 otherwise ;
and for any ¼ 2 ¢p(S1 £ T) consider the capacity
º1¼(E) := ¸
1¢ X
t2T
p(t) ¢ º t(E) + (1¡ ¸1) ¢ ¼(E): (A-2)
For any set T 0 ½ T; the DS-update of the capacity defined in Equation A-2 is (see Eichberger &
Kelsey (1999),Lemma 4.2, p. 132)
º1¼(T
0js1) =
¸1¢ P
t2T 0
p(t) + (1¡ ¸1)¢ P
t2T 0
¼(s1; t)
P
t2T
¼(s1; t) + ¸1 ¢
·
1¡ P
t2T
¼(s1; t)
¸ : (A-3)
For ¸1 > 0, º1¼(T 0js1) is a continuous function of ¼:
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For any s1 2 S1 and any ¼ 2 ¢p(S1 £ T); let
½(¼; s1) =argmax
¾2¢(A2)
X
a2A2
¾(a) ¢ P 2(ajs1; º1¼) (A-4)
be the set of best behaviour strategies on A2 for given history s1 and given belief º1¼ based on ¼:
From the definition of the Choquet integral in Equation 1, it is clear that P 2(ajs1; º1¼) is a continuous
function of the capacity º1¼: From the DS-update in Equation A-3 we know that º1¼ is a continu-
ous function of ¼: Thus,
P
a2A2
¾(a) ¢ P 2(ajs1;º1¼) is a continuous function of ¼: Hence, by Berge’s
maximum theorem (e.g., Takayama (1985), p. 254), ½(¼; s1) is a upper-hemi-continuous cor-
respondence. Since ¢(A2) is a convex set and since
P
a2A2
¾(a) ¢ P 2(ajs1; º1¼) is linear in ¾; the
correspondence ½(¼; s1) is also convex-valued.
For any t 2 T and a vector ¹ = (¹(¢js1))s12S1 of additive probability distributions ¹(¢js1) 2 ¢(A2)
define the capacities º2¹(E js1) := (1 ¡ ¸2) ¢ ¹(E js1): The capacity º2¹(¢js1) is continuous in ¹: Let
Ã(¹; t) =arg max
¾2¢(S1)
X
s12S1
¾(s1) ¢ P 1(s1jt; º2¹(¢js1)) (A-5)
be the best-response correspondence for player 1. Finally, let
Á(¹) := f¼ 2 ¢p(S1 £ T )j ¼(s1; t) =
X
t2T
p(t) ¢ ¾t(s1); ¾t 2 Ã(¹; t)g: (A-6)
Since the Choquet integral P 1(s1jt; º2¹(¢js1)) is continuous in º2¹(¢js1); which in turn is continuous in
¹; we can conclude that
P
s12S1
¾(s1) ¢ P 1(s1jt; º2¹(¢js1)) is continuous in ¹: Moreover, the objective
function is linear in ¾: Applying Berge’s maximum theorem again, we conclude that the correspon-
dences Ã(¹; t) are upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued. The correspondence Á(¹) defined in
Equation A-6 is a convex set for each ¹ and clearly also upper-hemi-continuous.
Consider the mapping £ : ¢p(S1 £ T) £ ¢(A2)jS1 j ! ¢p(S1 £ T) £ ¢(A2)jS1 j defined by
(¼; ¹) 7! £(¼; ¹) := £
s12S1
½(¼; s1) £ Á(¹):
As the Cartesian product of upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued correspondences £ is itself
a upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued correspondence. Moreover, the set ¢p(S1 £ T) £
¢(A2)jS1 j is compact and convex. Hence one can apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to estab-
lish the existence of (¼¤; ¹¤) 2 £(¼¤; ¹¤):
Define the additive probability distribution ¿ ¤ onS2; the set of strategies of player 2, by ¿ ¤(s2) :=
Q
s12S1
¹¤(s2(s1)js1) for all s2 2 S2: For all E ½ S2; let º2¿¤ (E) := (1¡ ¸2) ¢ ¿ ¤(E):
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We claim that the capacities (º1¼¤ ; º2¿ ¤) are a DSE. To see this, note first that suppº1¼¤ = fs1 2
S1j ¼¤(s1) > 0g and suppº2¿¤ = fs2 2 S2j ¿¤(s2) > 0g (Eichberger & Kelsey (1999),
Lemma 2.2, p. 121). Hence, (s1; t) 2 supp º1¼¤ implies ¼¤(s1; t) = p(t) ¢ ¾t(s1) > 0 and ¾t 2
Ã(¹¤; t): Hence, s1 must maximise P 1(s1jt; º2¹¤(¢js1)): Similarly, s2 2 suppº2¿¤ implies ¿¤(s2) > 0:
Hence, ¹¤(s2(s1)js1) > 0 for all s1 2 S1: Therefore, s2(s1) must be a maximiser of P 2(ajs1; º1¼¤ ):
Finally, by construction, ¸1(º1¼¤) = ¸1 and ¸2(º2¿¤ ) = ¸2. Since ¸1 and ¸2 were chosen arbitrarily,
the existence result follows for any ¸ 2 (0; 1):
Proposition 4.2:A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution over types is a Bayesian
equilibrium.
Proof. Note first that ¸ = 0 in the limit implies that the limit capacities (º1; º2) are additive proba-
bility distributions. Hence, suppº1 = f(s1; t) 2 S1 £ T j º1(s1; t) > 0g and suppº2 = fs2 2 S2j
º2(s2) > 0g: Moreover, º1n(s1; t) ! º1(s1; t) > 0 and º2n(s2) ! º2(s2) > 0; imply º1n(s1; t) > 0
and º2n(s2) > 0 for n large enough. Note also that P 1(s1jt; º2) is continuous in º2 andP 2(ajs1; ½) is
continuous in ½: If º1(fs1g£T ) > 0; i.e., if the DS-update º1(tjs1) is defined, then ½(¢js1) = º1(¢js1).
Suppose now that (º1; º2) is not a Bayesian equilibrium. Then there exists (s1; t) 2 suppº1 such
that P 1(s1jt; º2) < P 1(es1jt; º2) for some es1 2 S1 and/or s2 2 supp º2 such that P 2(s2(s1)js1; ½) <
P 2(eajs1; ½) for some ea 2 A2: By continuity of P 1(s1jt; º2) and P 2(ajs1; ½) in ½ and º2; respectively,
we can conclude that P 1(s1jt; º2n) < P 1(es1jt; º2n) for some es1 2 S1 and/or P 2(s2(s1)js1; ½n) <
P 2(eajs1; ½n) for some ea 2 A2: Since (s1; t) 2 supp º1 and s2 2 suppº2 imply that º1n(s1; t) > 0 and
º2n(s2) > 0 for n large, (s1; t) 2 suppº1n and s2 2 suppº2n follows. Hence, (º1n; º2n) is not a DSE.
Proposition 4.3: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and DSEL
(i) Every perfect Baysian equilibrium is a DSEL.
(ii) A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if all
updates are additive.
Proof. Part (i). The proof is constructive. For agivenperfect Baysianequilibrium (¼1; ¼2; f¹(¢js1)gs12S1 )
we show that there is a sequence of appropriately modified E-capacites17 (º1n; º2n; f½n(¢js1)gs12S1)
which converges to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The trick is to construct this sequence such
17 For more on E-capacities, their properties and updates, see Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
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that the Dempster-Shafer-update of any strategy s1 which is not played by any type in the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, ¼1(fs1g £ T) = 0; is not defined, i.e., º1n(S1nfs1g £T) = 1. Hence, one can
choose the update ½n(¢js1) arbitrarily, in particular equal to the update ¹(¢js1) of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. This sequence of capacities (º1n; º2n; f½n(¢js1)gs12S1 ) is a DSE by standard continuity
arguments.
Suppose there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium¼1 2 ¢(S1)£¢(T) with ¼1(S1£T 0) = P
t2T 0
p(t) for
all T 0 µ T; ¼2 2 ¢(S2) with (additive) out-of-equilibrium beliefs ¹(¢js1) 2 ¢(T) for all s1 2 S1:
Define a sequence of DS-equilibria ((º1n; ºn); f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) as follows:
Consider sequences ¸1n > 0 and ¸
2
n > 0 which converge to zero. Denote by S1+ µ S1 the set of
strategies with
P
t2T ¼1(s1; t) 6= 0: For any non-empty E µ S1 and F µ T let
º1n(E £ F ) =
(
1 if S1+ £ T µ E £ F
¸1n¢
P
t2T
p(t) ¢ º t(E £ F ) + (1 ¡ ¸1n) ¢ ¼1(E £ F ) otherwise ;
where
ºt(E £ F ) :=
½
1 if S1 £ ftg ½ E £ F
0 otherwise :
It is easy to check that º1n is a capacity which, by construction, agrees with the prior distribution p(t):
Moreover, º1n ! ¼1:
For s1 2 S1+; S1+ £ T * S1nfs1g £ T and º1n(S1nfs1g £ T) < 1: Hence, the DS-updates º1n(T 0js1)
are well-defined and converge to the Bayesian updates . The updates ½n(¢js1) = º1n(¢js1) are well-
defined and converge to ¹(¢js1):
On the other hand, for s1 =2 S1+ S1+ £ T µ S1nfs1g £ T and the DS-updates are not defined. Hence,
we can choose ½n(¢js1) = ¹(¢js1) for all n in this case.
Finally, for any subset E ½ S2; º2n(E) = (1¡ ¸n) ¢
P
s22E ¼
2(s2):
It is easy tocheck that the capacities º1n; º2n arestrategically ambiguousand that suppº1n = f(s1; t)j¼1(s1; t)
0g and suppº2n = fs2j¼2(s2) > 0g:By continuityofP 1 andP 2 inº2n and ½n; respectively, s1 2arg maxes12S1
P 1(es1jt; º2n) for all (s1; t) 2 supp º1n and s2(s1) 2arg maxea2A2 P 2(eajs1; ½n(¢js1)) for all s2 2 suppº2n:
Hence, ((º1n; º2n); f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) is a DSE:
Part (ii). Consider a sequence of strategically ambiguous DSE (º1n; º2n) ! (º1;º2) and, for all
s1 2 S1; ½n(¢js1) converges to an additive update ½(¢js1). Since º1 is additive, (s1; t) 2 supp º1
implies º1(s1; t) > 0: Suppose there is a es1 2 supp º1 such that P 1(es1jt; º2) > P 1(s1jt; º2). By
continuity of P 1 in º2; P 1(es1jt; º2n) > P 1(s1jt; º2n) for large n: Moreover, for large n; º1n(es1; t) >
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0 and, therefore, es1 2 supp º1n. This contradicts the assumption that (º1n; º2n) is a DSE. Hence,
((º1; º2); f½(¢js1)gs12S1) satisfies Condition PBE-a.
Since ½(¢js1) is additive, an analogous argument shows that Condition PBE-b must hold for ((º1; º2);
f½(¢js1)gs12S1): Finally, if º1(fs1g£T) = 1¡ º1((S1nfs1g)£T) > 0; then º1n((S1nfs1g)£T) < 1
for n large enough. Hence, all DS-updates are well-defined for large n and ½n(T 0js1) = º1n(T 0js1) !
½(T 0js1) = º1(T 0js1): Thus, Condition PBE-c is satisfied. Given the assumption that the DSEL
agrees with an additive prior distribution over types it is therefore a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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